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Models Don’t Decompose That Way: A Holistic View of Idealized Models 
Collin Rice 
Abstract 
Many (if not most) accounts of scientific modeling assume that models can be decomposed into 
the contributions made by their accurate and inaccurate parts. These accounts then argue that the 
inaccurate parts of the model can be justified by distorting only what is irrelevant. In this paper, I 
argue that this decompositional strategy requires three assumptions that are not typically met by 
our best scientific models. In response, I propose an alternative view in which idealized models 
are characterized as holistically distorted representations that are justified by allowing for the 
application of various (mathematical) modeling techniques. 
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1. Introduction 
Many (if not most) accounts of scientific modeling—across a range of debates—assume that 
models can be decomposed into the contributions made by their accurate and inaccurate parts.1 
These accounts also assume that real-world systems can be decomposed into the contributions 
made by the features that are relevant and irrelevant to the target phenomenon. It is then typically 
claimed that the accurate parts of a successful2 scientific model map onto what is relevant (or 
                                                 
1 A notable exception are fictionalist accounts of models (Frigg [2010]; Godfrey-Smith [2009]). However, since 
these fictionalist accounts focus on the ontology of models rather than on how models explain, how idealizations 
contribution to explanations, robustness analysis, realism, etc. they will not be my focus here. Moreover, I think the 
problems of the decompositional strategy can be solved without the additional metaphysical commitments to 
hypothetical systems that are involved with most fictionalist accounts of what models are. 
2 In most cases “successful” will mean explanatory. However, since some of the accounts that fall under the 
decompositional strategy are not explicitly focused on explanation it would be misleading to include that as a 
requirement of being successful. The point here is that the models that best achieve the goals of scientific inquiry 
will be those that meet these three assumptions. 
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important) and the inaccurate parts of the model only distort what is irrelevant (or unimportant). 
This allows one to argue that the accurate parts of the model are what “do the real work” while 
the inaccurate parts of the model are justified by distorting only what is irrelevant. This 
decompositional strategy is central to most (or at least a wide range) of our current accounts of 
how to model complex systems, how models explain, how idealizations contribute to model 
explanations, robustness analysis, and how idealized modeling is compatible with scientific 
realism. 
 In this paper, I argue that many of our best scientific models cannot be decomposed in the 
ways required by the decompositional strategy. To be clear, I will not be arguing that 
decomposition is a completely wrong-headed strategy—such decomposition is epistemically 
convenient when it obtains. However, I will contend that the decompositional strategy cannot be 
the whole story since it requires three assumptions that are not typically met by our best 
scientific models. As a result, decompositional accounts of modeling, explanation, idealization, 
robustness, realism, etc. need to be supplemented, or perhaps supplanted, by an alternative 
approach.  
Therefore, after arguing against the decompositional strategy, I will argue for what I call 
the holistic distortion view of how idealizations contribute to scientific models. According to this 
view, most idealized models in science are holistically (i.e. pervasively) distorted representations 
of their target systems (Rice [forthcoming]).  In other words, idealized models in science are 
typically greater than the sum of their accurate and inaccurate parts because they result from the 
complex interaction of various modeling assumptions and idealizations that produce a pervasive 
misrepresentation of most of the features of their target system(s). The use of these holistically 
distorted representations is justified, I will argue, because they allow for the application of 
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(mathematical) modeling techniques that provide epistemic access to the kinds of information 
scientists are interested in. Finally, since this holistic distortion view moves us away from 
focusing on accurate representation relations, I will argue that a promising alternative is to 
appeal to universality classes in order to link idealized models with their target system(s) in ways 
that allow for explanation and understanding (Batterman and Rice [2014]; Rice [forthcoming]). 
Universality can enable scientific modelers to discover relationships of counterfactual 
dependence between certain key features and an explanandum even if those relationships hold 
for drastically different reasons in the idealized model system than they do in the real-world 
system(s). Therefore, even if the model pervasively distorts its target system(s), it may still be 
possible to use the model to explain because many of the patterns of counterfactual dependence 
displayed by the model system will be similar to those of the model’s target system(s). 
 The following section presents several forms of the decompositional strategy that have 
been proposed across the philosophy of science literature and extracts three key assumptions 
required for the decompositional strategy to work. Then, Section 3 argues that many of our best 
scientific models cannot be decomposed in the ways required by those assumptions. In response, 
Section 4 proposes the holistic distortion view of idealized models. The final section concludes 
and offers some suggestions for how to develop the holistic distortion view further. 
2. The Decompositional Strategy 
In this section, I argue that a wide range of accounts, across numerous philosophical debates, can 
all be grouped under a general decompositional strategy that is committed to some version of the 
following three assumptions: 
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(1) Target Decomposition Assumption: The real-world system is decomposable such that the 
contributions of the features that are relevant to (e.g. difference-makers for) the 
occurrence of the target phenomenon can be isolated from the contributions of features 
that are irrelevant (or are largely insignificant) to the target phenomenon.3 
(2) Model Decomposition Assumption: The scientific model is decomposable such that the 
contributions of its accurate parts can be isolated from the contributions of its inaccurate 
(i.e. idealized or abstracted) parts. 
(3) Mapping Assumption: When successful, the accurate parts of the model can be mapped 
onto the relevant parts of the real-world system and the inaccurate parts of the model only 
distort the irrelevant parts of the real-world system.4 
While the following accounts are committed to these assumptions to different degrees and for 
different reasons, I think the discussion shows that they are all equally committed to a general 
decompositional strategy that requires some form of these three assumptions.5 
2.1. Mechanistic modeling and decomposition 
                                                 
3 One reviewer suggested a distinction between a feature’s being irrelevant and a feature’s being relatively 
unimportant. While this distinction can certainly be made, I don’t think this subtle difference in degree has much of 
an impact on the arguments that follow. Nonetheless, to avoid any confusion, my use of irrelevance (and relevance) 
here is meant to capture claims concerning causal irrelevance (e.g. difference making) and relative unimportance 
(e.g. having a negligible impact). The important point is that the target system is supposed to be decomposed into a 
set of relevant (or significant) and irrelevant (or insignificant) features—even though different versions of the 
decompositional strategy will determine what is relevant and irrelevant in slightly different ways. 
4 It is worth noting that Weisberg’s [2013] similarity account seems to have some resources for resisting this 
particular version of the mapping assumption since his account allows the relevant features to be included in the 
model and yet be distorted in various ways that make them less similar than the target system. However, in what 
follows I focus on Weisberg’s account of minimalist idealization in his [2007] paper and in Chapter 6 of his [2013] 
book, which is more directly committed to the mapping assumption as I have formulated it here. 
5 Given the range of views, from a number of debates, it is impossible to find the perfect wording that captures all 
the subtle details of every version of the general decompositional strategy. I think putting these assumptions in terms 
of relevant/irrelevant and accurate/inaccurate does the best job of capturing what these views have in common. 
Indeed, however these accounts determine relevance/irrelevance, the claim is that the model will be 
successful/explanatory just in case it accurately (to some degree) captures the relevant (or most important) features 
and only uses idealizations to distort irrelevant (or largely insignificant) features. Each account shares this general 
approach—although they may establish relevance/irrelevance and accuracy/inaccuracy in slightly different ways. 
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Many forms of decomposition have their roots in the mechanistic approach to modeling complex 
systems (Bechtel and Richardson [1993]; Craver [2006], [2007]; Craver and Darden [2013]; 
Machamer, Darden, and Craver [2000]). In general, the mechanistic approach focuses on 
decomposing systems into their constituent parts and localizing their characteristic activities in 
order to identify the modular (i.e. dissociable) contributions made by the parts of complex 
systems (Bechtel and Richardson [1993], p. 7). However, as Bechtel and Richardson repeatedly 
emphasize: 
Pursuing decomposition and localization is to impose an assumption on the nature of the system 
whose activities one is trying to explain: it is assuming that it is decomposable. A decomposable 
system is modular in character, with each component operating primarily according to its own 
intrinsically determined principles. (Bechtel and Richardson [1993], pp. 24-25) 
Indeed, the mechanistic approach to modeling assumes that the target system is decomposable 
into parts that each make a modular (i.e. dissociable) causal contribution to the functioning of the 
whole (Bechtel and Richardson [1993], p. 24; Levy [2014], p. 5; Woodward [2003], p. 48). It is 
then assumed that the contributions of the set of relevant parts and interactions of the target 
mechanism(s) can be segregated (i.e. isolated) from the rest of the surrounding environment and 
studied independently (Bechtel and Richardson [1993]). 
 In addition, most accounts of mechanistic modeling assume that successful models (e.g. 
those that can explain) are those models whose components and interactions accurately represent 
the relevant (i.e. difference-making) causal relationships among the components of the target 
mechanism(s) and leave out—i.e. abstract away—irrelevant features.6 In fact, the literature on 
mechanisms rarely addresses the relationship between mechanistic models and mechanisms 
themselves since it is routinely assumed that ‘the parts and organization of the model typically 
                                                 
6 It is unclear exactly what role idealizations play in mechanistic modeling accounts. While Kaplan and Craver 
[2011] note that idealization is compatible with their view, they provide no additional details about the role 
idealizations play within mechanistic modeling. 
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map directly to parts and organization of the object being investigated’ (Matthewson and Calcott 
[2011], p. 738). However, some mechanistic views do make it explicit that, ‘the goal is to 
describe correctly enough (to model or mirror more or less accurately) the relevant aspects of the 
mechanisms under investigation’ (Craver and Darden [2013], p. 94).7 Indeed, according to 
mechanistic accounts, for a model to explain is just for it to accurately describe the relevant parts 
of the target mechanism(s). Kaplan and Craver make this idea explicit in their endorsement of 
what they call a model-to-mechanism-mapping (3M) requirement in which mechanistic models 
explain in virtue of having their components, activities, properties, and organizational features 
map onto the relevant causal relations among the components of the target mechanism(s) 
(Kaplan and Craver [2011], p. 611). In sum, successful mechanistic models will accurately 
represent the relevant components and interactions of the target mechanism and will leave out 
irrelevant features. 
2.2. Accounts of scientific explanation that require decomposition 
The decompositional strategy is also prominent in several causal accounts of how models are 
able to explain. Indeed, most causal accounts of explanation require a model that explains to 
accurately represent (or describe) the difference-making causal relationships that produced the 
explanandum and isolate those factors from other irrelevant causes (Strevens [2009]; Woodward 
[2003]).  
 For example, Michael Strevens tells us that, ‘no causal account of explanation—certainly 
not the kairetic account—allows non-veridical models to explain’ (Strevens [2009], p. 320). 
Indeed, on Strevens’s kairetic account, ‘A standalone explanation of an event e is a causal model 
                                                 
7 See also Glennan [2005]. 
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for e containing only difference-makers for e’ in which, ‘the derivation of e, mirrors a part of the 
causal process by which e was produced’ (Strevens [2009], pp. 73-75). In other words, models 
that explain do so in virtue of accurately representing an isolable set of difference-making causal 
factors and leaving out (or idealizing away) other irrelevant causes. 
 In addition, James Woodward suggests that causal models explain when they ‘correctly 
describe’, ‘trace or mirror’, or are ‘true or approximately so’ with respect to the relevant causal 
relations that hold between the explanans and the explanandum (Woodward [2003], pp. 201-
203). Furthermore, in a later paper, Woodward suggests that, ‘good explanations should both 
include information about all factors which are such that changes in them are associated with 
some change in the explanandum-outcome of interest and not include factors such that no 
changes in them are associated with changes in the explanandum-outcome’ (Woodward [2010], 
p. 291). In other words, good explanations should accurately represent difference-making causal 
factors and abstract away irrelevant causal factors. 
 More generally, these causal accounts require that the target system can be decomposed 
into difference-making and non-difference-making causes. They also require that models can be 
used to isolate difference-making causes from other irrelevant factors. Finally, these accounts 
claim that models explain in virtue of accurately representing the isolable set of difference-
making causes that actually produced the target explanandum (and leaving out irrelevant 
factors). 
2.3. Accounts of idealization that require decomposition 
In addition, the decompositional strategy is central to many accounts of how idealizations 
contribute to models that explain (Elgin and Sober [2002]; Strevens [2009]; Weisberg [2007], 
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[2013]). As a first example, Mehmet Elgin and Elliott Sober [2002] argue that optimality models 
in evolutionary biology can still explain despite being idealized because the idealizations only 
distort features that are irrelevant or make little difference to the explanandum. They say:  
A causal model contains an idealization when it correctly describes some of the causal factors at 
work, but falsely assumes that other factors that affect the outcome are absent. The idealizations in 
a causal model are harmless if correcting them wouldn’t make much difference in the predicted 
value of the effect variable. Harmless idealizations can be explanatory (Elgin and Sober [2002], p. 
448). 
In other words, according to Elgin and Sober, idealized models can still explain because they 
only distort features that are irrelevant or largely insignificant. We can see that the distorted 
features are largely insignificant by noting that removing the idealizations from the model—or 
replacing them with true assumptions—would not make much difference to the predictions made 
by the model. Specifically, according to Elgin and Sober, idealized optimality models explain 
when they correctly describe the (difference-making) role of natural selection in bringing about 
the explanandum and only idealize other evolutionary factors that are assumed to be irrelevant to 
the outcome (e.g. drift). 
 In a similar way, Michael Weisberg describes what he calls minimalist idealization as, 
‘the practice of constructing and studying theoretical models that include only the core causal 
factors which gave rise to the phenomenon’ (Weisberg [2007], p. 642). According to Weisberg, a 
minimalist model ‘accurately captures the core causal factors’ since, ‘[t]he key to explanation is 
a special set of explanatorily privileged causal factors. Minimalist idealization is what isolates 
these causes and thus plays a crucial role for explanation’ (Weisberg [2007], pp. 643-5).  
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 Among others, Weisberg cites Strevens’s [2009] account of idealized models as an 
example of minimalist idealization.8 Strevens explains his account of how idealized models can 
explain in this way:  
The content of an idealized model, then, can be divided into two parts. The first part contains the 
difference-makers for the explanatory target...The second part is all idealization; its overt claims 
are false but its role is to point to parts of the actual world that do not make a difference to the 
explanatory target. The overlap between an idealized model and reality...is a standalone set of 
difference-makers for the target. (Strevens [2009], p. 318) 
In other words, according to Weisberg and Strevens, idealized models explain by accurately 
representing, or “overlapping” with, an isolable set of causal difference-makers and using 
idealizations to indicate (or eliminate) those causal factors that are irrelevant.9 Indeed, the 
general goal of these accounts is to show that, ‘the causal factors distorted by idealized models 
are details that do not matter to the explanatory target—they are explanatory irrelevancies. The 
distortions of the idealized model are thus mitigated’ (Strevens [2009], p. 340). 
Before moving on, it is worth addressing some possible tweaks to this kind of 
decompositional approach to idealized models. For example, although Strevens [2009] and 
Weisberg [2007] suggest a rather strict version of the assumptions of the decompositional 
strategy, the view of similarity Weisberg defends in his [2013] book seems to allow for some 
distortion (in terms of dissimilarities) regarding difference-making features. Moreover, rather 
than claiming that a minimalist model must accurately represent all the difference-makers, 
Weisberg might only require the inclusion of the most important core causal factors. In a similar 
way, Angela Potochnik [2015] defends a causal view of explanation on which some causally 
relevant factors can be omitted as long as they do not distort the outcome too much. That is, 
                                                 
8 Weisberg also includes Robert Batterman’s work on asymptotic explanation, Stephan Hartmann’s work on 
physical models, and Nancy Cartwright’s account of abstraction as examples of minimalist idealization. I do not 
think each of these accounts fits Weisberg's minimalist category, but for considerations of space I will not work 
through those details here. 
9 Moreover, Strevens argues, ‘All idealizations, I suggest, work in the same way’ (Strevens [2009], p. 341). 
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Potochnik’s account allows for some causally relevant factors to be neglected by models that 
explain if those factors are relatively unimportant to the causal pattern of interest within the 
current research program (Potochnik [2015], [forthcoming]). However, although Potochnik’s 
account allows for some difference-making causes to be omitted, she also defends a criteria of 
explanatory adequacy such that ‘a causal explanation must account for all of the significant 
causal influences on an event’ (Potochnik [2015], p. 1179). Indeed, like Elgin and Sober’s 
account, Potochnik’s view requires that ‘an explanation must take into account all the causal 
factors with a significant influence on the probability of the event’s occurrence’ (Potochnik 
[2015], p. 1178).10 Moreover, in line with Weisberg [2007], Potochnik suggests that, ‘the 
incorporation of idealizations into explanations is justified by the isolation of a casual pattern—
Weisberg’s ‘core causal factors’ (Potochnik [2015], p. 1173). This kind of view allows for some 
causally relevant factors to be left out of models that explain, but still requires explanations to 
isolate the causes that have a significant impact on the outcome.  
Both these moves attempt to allow for some distortion (or omission) of causally relevant 
factors by making accurate representation of those factors and their explanatory relevance 
matters of degree. Although this would weaken the assumptions of the decompositional strategy 
somewhat, the focus of these accounts is still on accurately capturing (to some sufficiently high 
degree) or “taking into account” the “most important” causal factors; e.g. those that have a major 
impact on the probability of the outcome. As a result, although these views use slightly different 
criteria to determine which causal factors are relevant to the model’s explanation, they still 
                                                 
10 Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for suggesting that I address these potential tweaks. However, although 
Potochnik’s view illustrates one way to potentially weaken the assumptions of the decompositional strategy, it isn’t 
clear to me that her view is an instance of that strategy since she claims there are lots of ways to “account for” causal 
factors without accurately representing them. Moreover, there are important parallels between certain parts of my 
holistic distortion view and the view Potochnik defends, but there are also crucial differences; e.g. my account does 
not require explanations to identify causal patterns. 
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identify an isolable set of relevant causal factors that idealized models must capture in order to 
explain. Consequently, these ways of weakening the assumptions of the decompositional strategy 
still won’t be able to account for the kinds of holistic distortion cases presented below where the 
model pervasively and drastically distorts most of system’s difference-making causes—including 
those that are quite important to the target phenomenon and have a significant impact on the 
probability of its occurrence. In short, simply narrowing the set of relevant features to a 
somewhat smaller set than all causal difference makers, or allowing for minor distortions of less 
significant difference-making features, won’t be able to overcome the challenges to the 
decompositional strategy posed by the kinds of holistic distortion cases presented below.11 
 In sum, all of these accounts require that the real-world system be decomposable into 
difference-making (or relevant) and non-difference-making (or irrelevant) features—even if they 
determine which features are relevant (or important) in slightly different ways. They also require 
that idealized models can be decomposed into their accurate and inaccurate parts. Finally, they 
claim that idealized models explain when they accurately represent (or capture) the relevant 
features (e.g. difference-making causes) and the idealized parts of the model only distort 
irrelevant features. 
2.4. Robustness analysis and decomposition 
Another way philosophers have employed the decompositional strategy is in applications of 
robustness analysis (Levins [1966]; Weisberg [2006]; Wimsatt [1981]). Richard Levins [1966] 
initially argued that, if we investigate a number of distinct models that, ‘despite their different 
assumptions, lead to similar results, we have what we can call a robust theorem that is relatively 
                                                 
11 Allowing for drastic distortion of difference-making features, or suggesting that there is no set of relevant features 
that the model ought to capture, would just be to abandon the core tenets of the decompositional strategy. 
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free of the details of the model’ (p. 20). This result, Levins argues, allows us to determine 
‘whether a result depends on the essentials of the model or on the details of the simplifying 
assumptions’ (p. 20). William Wimsatt [1981] generalizes Levins’s ideas by suggesting that: 
All the variants and uses of robustness have a common theme in the distinguishing of the real from 
the illusory; the reliable from the unreliable; the objective from the subjective; the object of focus 
from the artifacts of perspective; and, in general, that which is regarded as ontologically and 
epistemologically trustworthy and valuable from that which is unreliable, ungeneralizable, 
worthless, and fleeting. (p. 128) 
This is a fairly clear endorsement of the general idea behind the decompositional strategy: 
robustness analysis enables scientific models to be broken down into the dissociable 
contributions made by their accurate (i.e. real) and inaccurate (i.e. illusionary) parts where the 
accurate parts represent the relevant features of the model’s target system(s). 
 In addition, more contemporary accounts of robustness analysis have suggested that when 
we have a robust result we can sometimes infer additional claims about real-world systems. For 
example, Weisberg suggests that scientists can use robustness analysis to discover ‘robust 
properties’ that are the result of a ‘common structure’ of a set of idealized models (Weisberg 
[2006], pp. 736-737). Weisberg then suggests that these mathematical results are typically 
applied by attempting to ‘map [the equations] on to the properties of real or imagined…systems’ 
(Weisberg [2006], p. 738). This translates the common mathematical structure of the models into 
a common causal structure of real (or possible) systems. As a result, the modeler can claim that 
there is a robust theorem that holds between the common causal structure and the robust property 
in real-world systems. These further steps require that the model’s target systems can be 
decomposed into a common causal structure and other irrelevant factors in ways that mirror the 
decomposition of the set of idealized models into a common mathematical structure and other 
auxiliary assumptions. Moreover, the method requires that we can map the isolable common 
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structure of the models onto the relevant causal structure in the real-world system(s) that is 
responsible for the robust property. As a result, Weisberg’s description of how to fully apply 
robustness analysis to real-world systems requires a version of all three assumptions of the 
decompositional strategy.12 
2.5. Scientific realism and decomposition 
Finally, many defenses of scientific realism make use of a version of the decompositional 
strategy by suggesting that scientific models and theories are partially accurate representations. 
These are sometimes referred to as “selective confirmation” approaches to defending scientific 
realism (Leplin [1997]; Peters [2013]; Stanford [2003]). For example, Christopher Pincock 
[2011] has applied a version of the decompositional strategy in precisely this way. The general 
idea is that models can be decomposed into parts and we can believe that our best scientific 
models are sometimes accurate with respect to certain relevant parts of real-world systems. 
Therefore, we can maintain a version of realism because scientific models are sometimes 
accurate representations of the relevant features of real-world systems even if they distort other 
(presumably irrelevant) features. 
2.6. Three assumptions of the decompositional strategy 
What I have tried to show is that for a wide range of accounts in the philosophical literature there 
is an assumed mapping between the decomposition of scientific models and the decomposition 
of their target systems.13 More specifically, I argue that the accounts detailed above each adopt a 
                                                 
12 While not all applications of robustness analysis require a decompositional approach, often the inferences made 
require some form of those assumptions. For example, other defenders of robustness analysis have suggested that 
robustness analysis can allow us to ‘be more confident that the result depends not on the falsities we have introduced 
into the modeling, but rather on the common components’ (Kuorikoski et al. [2010], p. 551). 
13 Of course, the decompositional strategy might just claim, “natural systems and models have parts”, but that is a 
rather uncontroversial claim and is too widely applicable to be interesting. 
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general decompositional strategy that requires some version of the target decomposition 
assumption, model decomposition assumption, and mapping assumption that were presented at 
the beginning of this section.  
3. Against the Decompositional Strategy 
In order for the decompositional strategy to succeed, the three conditions given above must be 
met. However, in this section, I provide examples of how the model decomposition assumption 
and the mapping assumption can, and often do, fail to hold. Moreover, I argue that these cases 
are representative of much larger classes of models that will systematically fail to meet the 
requirements for applying the decompositional strategy. While I think objections can also be 
raised regarding the target decomposition assumption, I think philosophical accounts of 
modeling, explanation, idealization, and robustness ought to be kept independent of metaphysical 
commitments about the nature of real-world systems whenever possible.14 Consequently, I will 
simply note that there is no clear argument for requiring such a strong metaphysical assumption 
regarding real-world systems and instead focus my critique on the model decomposition 
assumption and the mapping assumption.  
3.1. Many scientific models don’t decompose that way 
The first problem with the decompositional strategy is that many of our best scientific models 
cannot be decomposed into the isolable contributions made by their accurate and inaccurate 
parts. According to the decompositional strategy, we should be able to isolate the contributions 
of the accurate part(s) of our models from the contributions made by their idealized part(s). This 
                                                 
14 I also think that the realism debate should avoid having philosophical accounts of realism imposing metaphysical 
structures on the world a priori. Instead, our metaphysical claims about the world ought to be epistemically justified 
by first looking at the nature of our models/theories and how they are able to relate to the world. However, filling 
out the details of this proposal would take us too far away from main focus of this paper. 
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implies that we should, at least in principle, be able to remove or replace the idealizations within 
our scientific models while leaving the contributions of the isolated accurate components intact. 
In other words, if scientific models are truly decompositional in this way, then the idealizations 
within our best scientific models should be eliminable in the sense that they could in principle be 
removed (or replaced) without affecting the parts (or contributions) of the model that accurately 
describe the relevant parts (or features) of the model’s target system(s). However, in this section, 
I argue that for a wide range of scientific models, idealizations cannot be quarantined in this way 
and their distortions are pervasive due to the fact that they are essential to the foundational 
mathematical frameworks of those models. Although a model’s having ineliminable idealizations 
and being unable to decompose the contributions of the model’s accurate and inaccurate parts are 
conceptually distinct, we can test the model decomposition assumption by considering what 
occurs to the contributions of the (purportedly) accurate parts of the model when the 
idealizations are eliminated.15 In many cases, the idealizations are essential (i.e. ineliminable) for 
the mathematical frameworks used in the model, which results in the pervasive distortion of most 
of the system(s) features, which in turn leads to the representation of the relevant (or important) 
parts of the system being distorted through the lens of the idealized mathematical framework. 
Consequently, the parts of the model that are supposed to be accurate representations of relevant 
features can only make their contributions within the context of the idealized mathematical 
modeling framework that pervasively distorts them (and many other features). When this is the 
case, the contributions of the idealized parts of the model cannot be isolated from the 
contributions made by the accurate parts of the model, but are instead intertwined within the 
pervasively distorted representation provided by the mathematical model.  
                                                 
15 Thanks to an anonymous reviewer who helped me be clearer about these distinctions and the connections between 
these concepts. 
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 As a first example, we can consider the ideal gas law, which states that PV = nRT where 
P is pressure, V is volume, T is temperature, n is the number of moles of gas, and R is the 
constant. This highly idealized equilibrium model is derived from simpler laws of gases (e.g. 
Boyle’s Law and Charles’ Law) and can be used to calculate macroscopic changes of measurable 
variables in real gases. The ideal gas law is at the heart of the kinetic theory of gases, which 
utilizes the Maxwell-Boltzmann distribution for the velocities of molecules. This distribution is 
derived by imposing a particular probability distribution on the micostates of the system and then 
averaging over those microstates to discern macroscale properties of gases. More specifically, 
the Maxwell-Boltzmann distribution requires that one assume that the molecules are in constant 
random motion, do not interact, and have velocities that are statistically independent of one 
another. This enables one to model the speed of the molecules using a Gaussian distribution (i.e. 
a bell curve) by applying the central limit theorem. Importantly, however, the Maxwell-
Boltzmann distribution applies only to ideal gases. In real gases, there are several additional 
factors (e.g. van der Waals interactions, vertical flows, relativistic speed limits and quantum 
exchanges) that make the gas particles’ speeds often very different from those specified by the 
Maxwell-Boltzmann distribution. 
 Indeed, the exact calculations provided by the ideal gas law require a long list of 
idealizing assumptions including: 
1. The gas consists of a large number of identical molecules in constant random motion. 
2. The volume occupied by the gas molecules is infinitesimally small compared to the 
volume of the container; i.e. the molecules do not take up any space. 
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3. The velocity (components) of each of the particles are statistically independent of one 
another. 
4. The molecules exert no long-range forces on one another and there are no intermolecular 
forces between the molecules. 
5. Collisions between the molecules and the walls of the container are perfectly elastic (or 
are simply assumed not to occur). 
6. The gas obeys the processes of classical Newtonian mechanics. 
Of course, each of these assumptions will fail to hold in many real-world gases, and no real-
world gas will satisfy all six of them. Despite these distortions, the ideal gas law can be used to 
explain and understand various behaviors of real gases. Indeed, many real gases behave close to 
the ways predicted by the ideal gas law and it has been used to explain fundamental features of 
gas behavior such as diffusion and pressure.  
 We might, then, ask the following question: What would the ideal gas law look like 
without these idealizations? Put slightly differently, which parts of the ideal gas law are the 
dissociable accurate parts that are describing the relevant (difference-making) parts of reality? I 
contend that we cannot really answer either of these questions because the idealizing 
assumptions made by the model are introduced to apply foundational mathematical techniques 
that result in a pervasively distorted representation of actual gases. Put differently, the 
contributions made by the purportedly accurate parts of the model only make their contributions 
within an idealized mathematical modeling framework that pervasively distorts those features. 
As a result, the contributions of the idealized and (purportedly) accurate parts of the model are 
intimately intertwined within a pervasive misrepresentation of the model’s target system(s). 
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 The issue here is that—contra Strevens [2009]—the idealizing assumptions within the 
ideal gas law are not simply noting that certain features of the gas are known to be irrelevant. 
Instead, they pervasively distort the components and interactions of real gases in order to allow 
for the application of mathematical tools—e.g. statistical modeling techniques—that enable 
scientists to extract explanatory information about the system. Without these idealizations the 
mathematical foundations of the model would not be applicable. It is precisely because these 
idealizations are essential to the foundational mathematical techniques involved that they are 
ineliminable from the explanations provided by the model and their distortions are so pervasive. 
The important point is that there is not an isolable part of the ideal gas model that accurately 
represents some dissociable set of difference-makers in real gases and is unaffected by the list of 
idealizing assumptions given above. Instead, an ideal gas is a fundamentally different kind of 
system—an idealized model system—that allows physicists to investigate, explain, and 
understand real-world gases, but does not accurately represent some dissociable set of difference 
makers of real gases. The fact that these idealizations are essential to the mathematical 
frameworks employed by the model demonstrates their pervasive effect on the overall 
description provided by the model. It also shows that it will be impossible to isolate the 
contributions made by some accurate part(s) of the model from the contributions made by these 
inaccurate (i.e. idealized) parts. The distortions introduced are simply too pervasive because they 
are constitutive of the foundational mathematical techniques required for the model to provide 
the explanation. 
 Parallel applications of mathematical modeling can be found in biology (Ariew et al. 
[2015]; Rice [2012], [2015], [2016]; Walsh et al. [2002]). Indeed, the foundational assumptions 
made by R. A. Fisher in developing population genetics were inspired by the assumptions 
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underlying the kinetic theory of gases (Morrison [1996], [2004], [2015]).16 Like Maxwell and 
Boltzmann, Fisher’s general approach was to make various idealizing assumptions about the 
nature of the individual components of the system and their interactions in order to develop 
general statistical models of the large-scale behaviors of populations (Morrison [2004]). 
Assuming that the individual-level events of the population are random and statistically 
independent allowed Fisher to apply the central limit theorem, which tells us that such a sample 
will conform to the normal distribution (i.e. a Gaussian bell curve). Then, by assuming the 
population is infinitely large, one can apply various laws of large numbers to eliminate sampling 
error (in this case genetic drift).17 Finally, Fisher averaged over the individual-level events in 
order to identify statistical features of the overall distribution of genotypic trait types and their 
fitnesses. In combination, these assumptions allowed Fisher to assume that biological 
populations approximated a normal distribution whose mean value was the expected outcome 
(presumably due to natural selection). As a result, Fisher argued that biological populations 
could be modeled statistically simply by knowing the mean and variance of the overall 
population. In other words, Fisher’s statistical assumptions allowed him to model evolving 
populations in such a way that no knowledge of the parts or their interactions is required. As 
Margaret Morrison puts it, Fisher saw that, ‘the kinetic theory had shown that knowledge of 
particular individuals was not required in order to formulate general laws governing the behavior 
of a population’ (Morrison [1996], p. S319).  
 More importantly, with Fisher’s statistical modeling we again see that when certain 
idealizing assumptions are made about the components of the system, scientists can use various 
                                                 
16 Fisher himself tells us that: ‘The whole investigation may be compared to the analytical treatment of the Theory of 
Gases’ (Fisher [1922], p. 321). 
17 The law of large numbers states that, as the samples size increases, the average of the quantities sampled will be 
closer to the expected outcome. 
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mathematical techniques to construct models with which to investigate, explain, and understand 
real-world systems.18 In order to do so, however, often requires that they move to a drastically 
distorted representation of those systems in order to apply those modeling techniques. The 
success of Fisher’s approach was due to his replacing actual populations with highly idealized 
model populations that relied on the statistical assumptions he adopted from gas theory. As a 
result of his idealizing assumptions, Fisher constructed an infinite model population in which 
evolution did not involve migration, genetic recombination, genetic interaction, or drift. This 
resulted in a pervasively distorted representation of the evolutionary processes in any real-world 
population. Indeed, Fisher’s work on population genetics was able to provide various 
explanations ‘only by invoking a very unrealistic and abstract model of a population’ (Morrison 
[2015], p. 24). These kinds of statistical modeling techniques would later become the foundation 
of modern population genetics. The most important parallel, for my purposes, is that once again 
the contributions made by the idealizing assumptions cannot be isolated from the contributions 
made by the accurate parts of these models because the idealizing assumptions are necessary for 
applying the mathematical framework used by these scientific modelers. 
 While some idealized models can perhaps be decomposed into the contributions made by 
their accurate and inaccurate parts, I argue that this decomposition is impossible for many of our 
best scientific models because the idealizations are essential to the foundational mathematical 
frameworks used within those models. As a result, without the idealizations, the mathematical 
techniques will not be applicable and so the explanation and understanding provided by the 
                                                 
18 As Morrison explains, ‘Fisher's mathematisation of selection created a new framework in which its operation was 
understood as an irreducibly statistical phenomenon, a reconceptualisation that emerges in conjunction with the 
application of specific mathematical...techniques’ (Morrison [2015], p. 41). See Walsh et al. [2002] and Ariew et al. 
[2015] for a similar interpretation. 
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model would be inaccessible.19 In addition, the essential role these idealizations play in the 
mathematical foundations of many scientific models shows that the contributions of the 
inaccurate parts cannot be isolated in the way required by the decompositional strategy. Instead, 
the purportedly accurate parts can only make their contributions within an idealized modeling 
framework that drastically distorts the model’s target system(s). Therefore, contrary to the 
decompositional strategy, in many cases idealizations are not innocent bystanders that can be 
quarantined by only distorting irrelevant (or insignificant) features; instead, they are deeply 
invested collaborators that allow for the application of various mathematical modeling 
techniques. 
3.2. Many idealizations distort difference-making features 
The second challenge to the decompositional strategy is that even if we assume the real-world 
system and the idealized model are decomposable in the ways required, the model’s idealizations 
will often distort difference-making (i.e. relevant) features of the model’s target system(s). As a 
result, we cannot map the accurate parts of the model onto what is relevant and its inaccurate 
parts onto what is irrelevant. 
 For example, the Hardy-Weinberg equilibrium model is used to explain and understand 
various features of heredity and variation. The model establishes a mathematical relation 
between genotypic frequencies that captures the genetic structure described by Mendelism. The 
model tells us that if we have a pair of alleles, A1 and A2, at a particular locus and in the initial 
population the ratio of A1 to A2 is p to q, the distribution for all succeeding generations will be, 
                                                 
19 It is, however, possible that removing or replacing the idealizing assumptions would result in a modified version 
of the model, a different kind of model, or a different explanation. The most important point here is not whether the 
idealizations can be eliminated from the model, but instead is the pervasive nature of the distortions they introduce 
due to their role in the foundational mathematical frameworks of the model. This is enough to show the failure of the 
model decompositional assumption. My thanks to an anonymous reviewer for helping me clarify this point. 
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 p2A1A1 + 2pqA1A2 + q
2A2A2 
regardless of the distribution of genotypes in the initial population (or generation). This 
mathematical model describes the frequencies of different genotypes at a single locus in an 
infinitely large population, in which mutation, selection, sampling error, and migration do not 
occur, all members of the population breed, all mating is completely random, all organisms have 
the same number of offspring, there is no intergenerational overlap, and all these conditions are 
held constant. However, each of these distorted features makes a difference to the evolution of 
most (if not all) real-world biological populations. For example, in all real finite populations 
there will be some non-negligible chance that trait frequencies will diverge from the values 
predicted by selection; i.e. drift makes a difference to every real-world population (Rice [2015]). 
As a result, removing sampling error (i.e. drift) from this mathematical model distorts a 
difference-making feature of every real-world population. In addition, the Hardy-Weinberg 
model assumes that there is no intergenerational overlap, but this is false of (almost) every real-
world population and is a difference-making feature for many evolutionary outcomes (Levy 
[2011]).  
In addition, as was the case in the examples above, many of these idealizing assumptions 
are necessary for the mathematical foundations of the model (Morrison [2015]). For example, 
without the assumptions of infinite population size and random mating, the stability of genotypic 
frequencies across generations will be violated—that is, without these assumptions the very 
mathematical framework used by the model that allows it to capture key features of heredity and 
variation will no longer be applicable. 
 23 
 More generally, biological modelers frequently utilize several idealizations that distort 
the actual processes involved in mating, genetic recombination, inheritance, and selection in 
order to apply various mathematical modeling techniques. In doing so, they often distort features 
of real-world systems that make a difference to their evolutionary outcomes (Potochnik 
[forthcoming]; Rice [2012], [2015], [2016]). Indeed, using idealizations that distort difference-
making factors is pervasive in biological modeling—even within mechanistic modeling (Love 
and Nathan [2015]).20  
What is more, idealization of difference-makers is widespread in several other sciences; 
e.g. models in chemistry and physics can be used to explain despite misrepresenting the 
fundamental kinds of components, interactions, and properties that exist in real systems 
(Batterman [2002]; Batterman and Rice [2014]; Bokulich [2011], [2012]; Morrison [2015]).21 As 
a result of their distortion of difference makers, the distortions introduced by the inaccurate parts 
of these models cannot be isolated to the distortion of the irrelevant parts (or features) of their 
target system(s). Therefore, once again, for a wide range of cases across numerous sciences one 
of the three core assumptions required to apply the decompositional strategy fails to hold. 
4. An Alternative Approach: The Holistic Distortion View of Idealized Models 
The general goal of the decompositional strategy is to show that the accurate parts of the model 
are what “do the real work” while the inaccurate parts of the model are justified by distorting 
only what is known (or assumed) to be irrelevant. However, the arguments above show that for a 
                                                 
20 For example, even more distortion of difference-making features is involved in game-theoretic modeling, which 
routinely uses idealizing assumptions such as random pairing of players, symmetric contests, constant payoff 
structures across iterations of the game, etc. 
21 For example, Alisa Bokulich ([2011], [2012]) discusses various cases in which fictions that drastically distort 
relevant features of the target system are employed to explain in physics and chemistry. Batterman and Rice [2014] 
also discuss examples of models in physics and biology that distort difference-making causes and yet are able to 
provide explanations. 
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wide range of cases across many scientific disciplines this decompositional strategy will fail. As 
a result, an alternative approach is needed. In what remains, I will argue for what I call the 
holistic distortion view of idealized models (Rice [forthcoming]). In its most general form, 
holism is just the thesis that the whole is more than the sum of its parts. I contend that many 
idealized models in science are holistic distortions that cannot be decomposed into the 
contributions made by their accurate and inaccurate parts.  
 It is important to note, however, that my holistic distortion view does not (directly) entail 
other more traditional forms of holism concerning semantics, metaphysics, or confirmation. 
Instead, I only advocate a more holistic approach concerning philosophical attempts to analyze 
the use of idealized models in science. Specifically, I contend that many (if not most) idealized 
models should be characterized as holistically distorted representations of their target system(s) 
that are greater than the sum of their accurate and inaccurate parts. The decompositional strategy 
mistakenly ignores the myriad ways in which the explanations and understanding provided by 
scientific models are typically the result of a rich and complicated mixture of various modeling 
assumptions whose contributions cannot be studied in isolation. Therefore, my holistic view is a 
methodological prescription for philosophers’ attempts to understand how to model complex 
systems, how models explain, how idealizations contribute to model explanations, robustness 
analysis, and how idealized modeling is compatible with scientific realism. Most importantly, 
philosophy of science must move beyond accounts of these aspects of modeling that require the 
assumptions of the decompositional strategy. 
 The second part of my view is that idealizing assumptions that result in holistic 
distortions are often essential to the explanations provided by scientific models because they 
allow for the application of various (mathematical) modeling techniques (Cartwright [1983], Ch. 
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7; Rice [forthcoming]). In addition to the cases discussed above, a particularly instructive 
example is physicists’ use of the thermodynamic limit. The thermodynamic limit ‘is the limit in 
which (roughly speaking) the number of particles of the system…approaches infinity’ 
(Batterman [2010], p. 7). What is important to note is that often, ‘This limiting idealization is 
essential for the explanation because for a finite number of particles the statistical mechanical 
analogs of the thermodynamic functions cannot exhibit the nonanalytic behavior necessary to 
represent the qualitatively distinct behaviors we observe’ (Batterman [2010], p. 7). Indeed, for a 
wide range of modeling techniques in physics, the thermodynamic limit is an essential 
mathematical operation. For example, as Morrison explains in the case of modeling phase 
transitions: 
The occurrence of phase transitions requires a mathematical technique known as taking the 
‘thermodynamic limit,’ N→∞; in other words we need to assume that a system contains an infinite 
number of particles in order to understand the behavior of a real, finite system…[since] the 
assumption that the system is infinite is necessary for the symmetry breaking associated with 
phase transitions to occur. In other words, we have a description of a physically unrealizable 
situation (an infinite system) that is required to explain a physically realizable phenomenon (the 
occurrence of phase transitions). (Morrison [2009], p. 128).22 
Like the cases discussed above, the thermodynamic limit is not introduced simply as a way of 
ignoring what is irrelevant to the target explanandum or as a method for calculational 
expediency. Instead, these idealized mathematical descriptions function as a necessary condition 
for using the mathematical techniques required to explain and understand the phenomenon of 
interest (Batterman [2002], Morrison [2009], Kadanoff [2000]). 
 As I noted above, additional instances of the use of idealizations to allow for the 
application of mathematical techniques can be found across biological modeling. As another 
example, optimization models that provide adaptationist explanations make use of numerous 
                                                 
22 Or as physicist Leo Kadanoff [2000] puts it, ‘The existence of a phase transition requires an infinite system. No 
phase transitions occur in systems with a finite number of degrees of freedom’ (p. 238). 
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idealizations that allow for exact calculations of the equilibrium point of the evolving system 
(Rice [2012], [2015], [2016]). Rather than distorting irrelevant factors so scientists can focus on 
the accurate representation of difference-making features (e.g. natural selection), these models 
purposefully move scientists away from even attempting to accurately represent some isolable 
part of the dynamical processes that led to the explanandum. Instead, in these cases, the 
idealizing assumptions enable scientists to apply various mathematical techniques that allow 
them to calculate exactly how changes in the parameters involved in the system’s constraints and 
tradeoffs will result in changes in the expected equilibrium point of the system. The explanation 
is then provided by showing how the optimal strategy (counterfactually) depends on those 
constraints and tradeoffs—despite the fact that the optimal strategy is the expected outcome 
within the idealized model for very different reasons than in the model’s target system(s). 
 Indeed, as Mark Pexton notes, in many scientific models there are ‘ineliminable 
misrepresentations of the true ontology of a system…[They] are necessary in some models 
because we require them to frame a system in a certain way in order to extract modal 
information’ (Pexton [2014], p. 2344). It is this last part about the way in which idealizations 
allow scientists to frame the system as a whole to extract modal information about the system 
that I think has been largely missed by the philosophical literature (although Cartwright [1983], 
Ch. 7 and parts of Potochnik [2015] are important exceptions).23 The source of this failure is that 
most philosophers (and many scientists) have sought to quarantine idealization in order to show 
that the falsehoods used in science are “harmless” because they only distort irrelevant or 
                                                 
23 Potochnik’s [2015] account in which idealizations can be used to frame the system in different ways that make 
different causal patterns accessible is similar in that the reframing of the system make positive epistemic 
contributions. The key difference between our views is that I would resist the claim that this is always done by 
enabling the model system to display a causal pattern. 
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unimportant features and do not “get in the way” of the accurate parts of scientific models that 
do the real work. 
 As an alternative project, I suggest that philosophers of science ought to provide accounts 
of the pervasive and unique contributions that idealizations that distort difference-making (i.e. 
relevant) features can make to models conceived of as holistic distortions; e.g. by enabling 
scientific modelers to use certain mathematical modeling tools that extract the explanations and 
understanding they are interested in.24 Rather than attempting to isolate individual idealizations 
and show that their distortions are irrelevant (one at a time), we need to analyze how the practice 
of constructing holistically distorted models is able to consistently make positive contributions to 
achieving the goals of scientific inquiry—e.g. explanation and understanding—without having to 
provide an accurate representation of an isolated set of difference-making features.25 
 Here, then, is the core of my holistic distortion view. First, in a wide range of cases, 
idealized models pervasively distort the fundamental nature of the entities, processes, and 
features of their target systems—including difference makers. That is, their distortions are 
holistic, rather than piecemeal. Second, these idealizing assumptions often move scientists to an 
entirely different representational framework in which the mathematical tools necessary to 
explain and understand the phenomenon of interest are applicable. These different mathematical 
modeling frameworks represent different features and patterns of the system (e.g. statistical 
patterns at the population level) in different ways (e.g. as continuous processes or isolable 
                                                 
24 This is not intended to suggest that no philosophers have discussed some of the positive contributions of 
idealizations (e.g. see Strevens [2009] or Potochnik [2015]), only that I advocate focusing on the development of 
those accounts in line with the holistic distortion view that allows for the distortion of difference-makers instead of 
accounts that require the assumptions of the decompositional strategy. These contributions also provide access to 
explanations that would otherwise not be accessible rather than accomplishing what could also be accomplished by 
the use of abstraction of irrelevant features. Consequently, these contributions go beyond the indication of the 
irrelevance of some features—this is what makes these idealizations’ contributions to holistic distortions unique. 
25 I do not intend to suggest that these are the only goals of scientific inquiry. They are merely representative of the 
kinds of goals that scientists have been able to achieve with holistically distorted models. 
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factors) and allow for the use of different techniques for deriving the behavior of the system (e.g. 
using statistical limit theorems). As a result, these idealizations are often necessary for the 
models to provide a particular explanation (or understanding) of the target phenomenon—one 
that is sometimes the only explanation available. A model without these idealizing assumptions 
would be unable to use the mathematical techniques required for extracting the explanatory 
information of interest (Rice [forthcoming]). The goal, therefore, should be to justify scientists’ 
use of these holistically distorted representations in terms of the explanations and understanding 
they provide that would otherwise be unattainable. Analyzing these unique contributions of 
idealizations that distort difference-making features is in stark contrast to trying to show that the 
inaccurate parts of scientific models distort only what is irrelevant (or only tell us about what is 
irrelevant).  
 The remaining challenge, then, is to show how such holistically distorted representations 
can still provide explanatory information given that most accounts of explanation (e.g. those 
discussed above) require accurate representation of difference-making features in order for 
models to explain. While I advocate a pluralistic approach to understanding the relationships 
between idealized models and real-world systems, one particularly promising strategy is to 
appeal to a feature called universality (Batterman and Rice [2014]; Rice [forthcoming]). The 
term universality comes from mathematical physics, but in its most general form it is just an 
expression of the fact that many systems that are (perhaps extremely) heterogeneous in their 
physical features will nonetheless display similar patterns of behavior at macroscales. The group 
of systems that will display similar macrobehaviors despite differences in their physical details 
are said to be in the same universality class. As physicist Leo Kadanoff [2013] puts it, 
‘Whenever two systems show an unexpected or deeply rooted identity of behavior they are said 
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to be in the same universality class’ (p. 178). In other words, universality guarantees that a class 
of systems, called the universality class, will display the same general patterns of macrobehavior 
even if the components, interactions, dynamics, and physical details of those systems are very 
different. For example, universality can connect the behavior of systems as diverse as magnets 
and fluids (Batterman [2002]). It can also show why a large class of biological systems will all 
reach the same equilibrium point (e.g. a 1:1 sex ratio) despite differences in the kinds of species, 
methods of inheritance, size of the population, etc. (Batterman and Rice [2014]). In addition, 
within these universality classes there are often various model systems—that is, universality 
classes that include a range of real-world systems will often also include some (imaginary or 
possible) systems described by scientific models. When this is the case, the model system(s) and 
the real-world system(s) will display similar macroscale behaviors despite having perhaps drastic 
differences in their fundamental components, interactions, and other features. This connection, I 
contend, is often what enables scientists to use highly idealized models that holistically distort 
their target system(s) to explain various behaviors of their target system(s). In other words, 
universality can show us that there is a class of systems, which includes the idealized model 
system and its target system(s), that will exhibit the same macroscale patterns of behavior and 
this link is often what allows scientists to justifiably use holistically distorted models to explain 
and understand the behavior of real systems (Batterman and Rice [2014]; Rice [forthcoming]).  
 It is important to distinguish this appeal to the empirical fact of universality to link model 
systems with their target systems from the use of mathematical techniques to explain universality 
itself. For example, the renormalization group (RG), has been used to explain why a wide range 
of fluids (and magnets) all display universal behaviors near their critical points (Batterman 
[2002]). RG is a mathematical technique that effectively transforms a system's original 
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Hamiltonian into another Hamiltonian that describes a system with fewer degrees of freedom. 
Repeatedly applying this technique at successively larger scales eventually identifies a fixed 
point Hamiltonian that preserves the original Hamiltonian's form and phenomenological 
behavior, but eliminates many of the irrelevant physical details. Furthermore, demonstrating that 
diverse fluids all flow to the same fixed points in the space of Hamiltonians under repeated 
applications of RG explains why those systems will display the same macrobehavior despite 
perhaps drastic differences in their physical details. As a result, RG enables physicists to 
explicitly delimit the class of systems that will display similar macroscale behaviors; e.g. having 
the same critical exponent when undergoing a phase transition.  
RG effectively differentiates a set of relevant features from a set of microphysical details 
that are irrelevant and, in doing so, explains why the universal macroscale behaviors are stable 
across that class of systems—this is what enables RG to provide an explanation of universality. 
In other words, rather than aiming for the construction of models that accurately represent 
relevant features and idealize irrelevant features, RG is a mathematical modeling technique—
whose application also requires the thermodynamic limit—that systematically distinguishes 
those features that are relevant and irrelevant in order to provide an explanation of the stability of 
the macroscale behaviors across a diverse range of (real, possible, and model) systems. 
Moreover, in addition to explaining various instances of universality using RG, physicists have 
also discovered several so-called “minimal models” (e.g. the lattice gas automaton model) within 
those universality classes that display the same patterns of behavior and can be used to further 
investigate and explain the behaviors of real-world systems (Batterman and Rice [2014]).26 
While providing additional demonstrations that explain universality itself will typically 
                                                 
26 Furthermore, while RG is an instructive example, universality can also be explained using other methods; e.g. 
appealing to some kind of multiple realizability. 
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provide greater degrees of understanding and justification (and may be required to provide a 
complete explanation for some explananda), providing a complete explanation of why 
universality occurs (e.g. by using RG) is not a requirement for appealing to the empirical fact of 
universality to connect the behavior of various real, possible and model systems in ways that 
allow for idealized models to be justifiably used to discover explanatory information.27 That is, 
scientists can justifiably use idealized models within a universality class to explain the behaviors 
of real-world systems in that class even when they fail to have a complete explanation of why 
that universality class occurs. Indeed, there are many universality classes out there that contain 
various real, possible, and model systems, but whose universality has yet to be explicitly 
delimited (i.e. specifying precisely the range of systems in the class) or completely explained 
(i.e. explaining why those patterns are stable across that class of systems). 
In this context, the universality class consists of the set of real, possible and model 
systems that display the patterns of counterfactual dependence of interest to the scientific 
modeler. In some cases, the idealized models that are within the same universality class as their 
target systems will just be those that accurately represent the difference-making features of those 
systems.28 However, in many other cases, the same macrobehaviors will be produced by different 
sets of difference-makers and extremely heterogeneous components and interactions across a 
range of possible systems. In these cases, scientists often construct a pervasively distorted model 
in order to apply the (mathematical) modeling techniques and theories they have on hand. The 
resulting idealized model is then used to investigate how various (hopefully measurable) features 
are counterfactually related to the phenomenon of interest. When the holistically distorted model 
                                                 
27 Indeed, scientists often explain by appealing to idealized models that are in the same universality class as their 
target systems before any explicit delimiting or explaining of universality has been attempted. 
28 For example, this will occur when the same set of difference-makers are necessary and sufficient conditions for 
the occurrence of the target explanandum in every real and possible system. 
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is (or perhaps can be shown to be) in the same universality class as the system(s) of interest, 
scientists can justifiably use the holistically distorted model to explain because it can be used to 
discover information about which features are counterfactually relevant (and irrelevant) to the 
target explanandum.  
 For example, the ideal gas law need not accurately represent the ontology of real gases or 
the actual processes that relate pressure and temperature in order to show us how pressure 
counterfactually depends on temperature (and vice versa). All that is required is that the model 
enable us to see how changes in one feature will result in changes in the other and universality 
can guarantee that those macroscale patterns of counterfactual dependence will be preserved 
even though the model is a holistically distorted representation of the components, processes, 
and interactions of real gases. This is because the macroscale patterns of counterfactual 
dependence between measurable features of real gases will be realized by any system in the 
universality class—including the pervasively distorted model system.  
 As a second example, a biological optimization model can show us how changes in the 
constraints and tradeoffs among various features of the system will change the equilibrium point 
of the evolving population even if the model describes a selection process that is nothing like the 
one that produced the explanandum in its real-world target system(s) (Rice [2012], [2015], 
[2016], [forthcoming]). The explanation is provided by showing how the equilibrium point of the 
evolving system is counterfactually related to certain features of the target system, not by 
accurately representing those features or some modular part of the dynamics that connects those 
features to the explanandum in the real-world system. In these cases, biological optimization 
models show how the target explanandum is counterfactually dependent on certain constraints 
(e.g. the amount of resources available) and tradeoffs (e.g. between average energy intake and 
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average predation risk) even though the model represents these features in a highly distorted 
way. Moreover, the optimization model describes a selection process—which connects these 
features to the target explanandum—that drastically distorts the selection process that occurs in 
real biological populations; e.g. these models typically represent selection without a temporal 
dimension and assume that offspring perfectly resemble their parents within an infinitely large 
population. Nonetheless, biologists have discovered that (and in some cases demonstrated why) 
these kinds of counterfactual dependencies are stable across a range of real, possible, and model 
systems that are heterogeneous in many of their details including having different species, 
interactions, inheritance processes, etc. That is, although it describes a system that is drastically 
different from its target system(s), the optimization model—in virtue of being in the same 
universality class—still displays certain macroscale patterns of counterfactual dependence 
between certain constraints and tradeoffs and the target explanandum that can be used to provide 
an explanation. Revealing these patterns of counterfactual dependence by applying mathematical 
modeling techniques, however, is importantly different from accurately representing those 
features and the ways they produce (or result in) the target explanandum in real-world systems. 
In sum, highly idealized models can allow scientists to discover counterfactual 
dependencies that hold between certain features and the target explanandum without having to 
accurately represent the entities, processes, mechanisms, or difference-makers of their target 
system(s). Importantly, this kind of information about counterfactual dependencies is widely 
held to be important to many forms of explanation (Bokulich [2011], [2012]; Rice [2015]; 
Woodward [2003]). As Woodward puts it, ‘[an] explanation must enable us to see what sort of 
difference it would have made for the explanandum if the factors cited in the explanans had been 
different in various possible ways’ (Woodward [2003], p.11). In addition, Bokulich argues that, 
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‘in order for a model M to explain a given phenomenon P, we require that the counterfactual 
structure of M be isomorphic in the relevant respects to the counterfactual structure of P’ 
(Bokulich [2011], p. 39). Indeed, information about counterfactual dependence is central to 
several accounts of how models are able to explain (Bokulich [2012]; Rice [2015], 
[forthcoming]; Saatsi and Pexton [2013]; Woodward [2003]).29 
 The key thing to notice is that idealized models can provide information about 
counterfactual dependencies even when they fail to accurately represent the system’s 
components and interactions or the actual processes that link those components and interactions 
to the target explanandum. In many instances this is because universality guarantees that the 
model system’s patterns of macroscale behavior will be similar to those of the target system(s) 
even if the actual entities and processes of those systems are extremely different. In other words, 
universality can enable scientific modelers to discover relationships of counterfactual 
dependence between certain features and an explanandum even if those relationships hold for 
drastically different reasons in the idealized model system than they do in the real-world 
system(s). Therefore, even if the model drastically and pervasively distorts the fundamental 
nature of the entities and processes of real-world systems in order to use various mathematical 
modeling techniques, it can still be used to explain because many of the patterns of 
counterfactual dependence that hold in the model system will be similar to those of real-world 
systems—those counterfactual relations will just hold for (perhaps very) different reasons in the 
model system and perhaps only in limiting cases. Generalizing the concept of universality allows 
us to capture this stability of various patterns of behavior (e.g. counterfactual dependencies) that 
are largely independent of the physical components, interactions, and features of a heterogeneous 
                                                 
29 While I believe there are both causal and noncausal explanations in science, the emphasis on counterfactual 
information is compatible with many of the exclusively casual accounts of explanation on offer. 
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class of (real, possible and model) systems (see Batterman and Rice [2014] and Rice 
[forthcoming] for additional details).  
In this way, universality enables us to see how idealized models can be used to explain 
even when they are holistically distorted representations of their target system(s). Indeed, 
discovering stable universal behaviors allows scientific modelers to move away from attempting 
to accurately represent some isolable set of difference-making parts of real-world systems and 
instead focus on discovering highly idealized models within the same universality class that will 
enable them to apply the mathematical and theoretical techniques necessary to discover the 
counterfactual dependence information required to explain and understand various phenomena.  
 One of the key projects of philosophy of science should be to understand how scientists’ 
use of highly idealized models has been so successful in terms of generating explanations and 
understanding of our world. I have argued that there are at least two links between idealized 
models and their target systems that can be used to justify scientists’ use of idealized models to 
explain and understand real-world phenomena: (1) accurate representation of difference makers, 
or (2) being within the same universality class. 
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Figure 1: The different links that can hold between idealized models and their target systems that allow scientists to 
use the idealized model to explain and understand real-world phenomena. 
While appealing to universality is a promising approach to justifying the use of holistically 
distorted models, I want to emphasize that I think one of the key lessons of the above discussion 
is that philosophers need to be more pluralistic about the kinds of relationships that can hold 
between idealized models and real-world systems that are sufficient for explanation and 
understanding. Some idealized models will accurately represent difference-makers of their target 
system(s), others will be in the same universality class as their target system(s), and others will 
perhaps exploit some alternative connection to their target system(s) (see Figure 1 above).  
Indeed, given the diverse array of modeling techniques and goals across various disciplines we 
should expect there to be an equally diverse set of ways that models can relate to real-world 
systems and provide the explanations and understanding of interest to scientific modelers. 
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 In sum, the four main claims of my holistic distortion view of idealized models are the 
following: 
(1) Many (if not most) idealized models in science ought to be characterized as holistically 
distorted representations of their target system(s). 
(2) Idealizing assumptions that result in holistically distorted representations typically make 
essential contributions by allowing for the application of various (mathematical) 
modeling techniques.  
(3) The use of such holistically distorted models ought to be justified by their ability to 
provide epistemic access to explanations and understanding that would otherwise be 
inaccessible.30 
(4) Given the diversity of modeling techniques and goals found in scientific practice, we 
require a more pluralistic approach to investigating the relationships between models and 
their target systems that justify their use in developing explanations and understanding. 
The task going forward is to provide the justification called for in (3) and (4) by looking at 
particular examples and enumerating the ways that holistically distorted models provide access 
to explanations and understanding that would otherwise be inaccessible. I have proposed one 
additional way this can be done: by appealing to the fact that the holistically distorted model is 
within the same universality class as its target system(s). I have provided an outline of that 
approach here, but, like any new account, some of the details of this approach will have to be 
worked out in other papers. However, these four claims do provide the foundation for a 
                                                 
30 Holistically distorted models can also allow for predictions that would otherwise be inaccessible, but that kind of 
contribution is beyond the scope of this paper. 
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fundamentally different way of thinking about idealized modeling in science that avoids the 
mistakes of the decompositional strategy. 
5. Conclusion 
The decompositional strategy is pervasive across a wide range of debates in the philosophy of 
science. I have argued that the assumptions underlying these decompositional approaches will 
fail to hold for a wide range of cases of scientific modeling. In response, I have proposed the 
holistic distortion view, which offers an alternative approach to characterizing and justifying the 
use of idealized models. Going forward, I suggest that philosophers of science take up the 
challenge of showing how scientific modelers are justified in using idealized models that 
holistically distort their target systems by analyzing the ways in which various modeling 
techniques can produce explanations and understanding that would otherwise be inaccessible. In 
other words, philosophers of science need to investigate the ubiquitous and unique contributions 
that various holistically distorted scientific representations make to scientific inquiry rather than 
continuing their attempts to ignore, remove, isolate, or quarantine the roles idealizations play 
within scientific theorizing. 
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